

EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW

EDITORS

Jörg Monar

Professor of Contemporary European Studies,
Sussex European Institute, University of Sussex

Nanette Neuwahl

Professor of European Law, Centre for Research
in Public Law, University of Montreal

ASSOCIATE EDITOR

Professor Christophe Hillion

Europa Institute, University of Leiden,
The Netherlands

BOOK REVIEW EDITOR

Professor Alasdair Blair

Head of Department of Politics and Public Policy
De Montfort University
The Gateway
Leicester LE1 9BH, UK
Tel: 0116 2577209
Email: ablair@dmu.ac.uk

BOOK REVIEW EDITOR

Professor Sven Biscop

EGMONT, Royal Institute
for International
Relations (IRRI-KIIB)
Rue de Namur 69
1000 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: +32 (0)2-213-40-23
Fax: +32 (0)2-223-41-16
Email: s.biscop@irri-kiib.be

EDITORIAL OFFICE

Dr Saïd Hammamoun,

Center for Research in Public Law
University of Montreal
C.P. 6128, Succursale Centre-ville
Montreal QC
Canada H3C 3J7
Phone: +1 514 343-6111 # 2661
Fax: +1 514 343-7508
Email: said.hammamoun@umontreal.ca

ADVISORY BOARD

Dr Gianni Bonvicini

(Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome)

Professor Jacques Bourrinet

(University Paul Cezanne (Aix Marseille III))

Prof. Dr Günter Burghardt

(Ambassador (Ret.))

Professor Marise Cremona

(Department of Law, European University Institute,
Florence)

Professor Alan Dashwood

(University of Cambridge)

Professor Sir David Edward

(Judge of the Court of Justice of the EC, 1992–2004)

Dr Geoffrey Edwards

(University of Cambridge)

Professor Piet Eeckhout

(King's College London)

Lord Hannay of Chiswick

(House of Lords)

Professor Christopher Hill

(University of Cambridge)

Prof. Dr Horst G. Krenzler

(Former Director-General External Relations
and Trade, European Commission)

Prof. Dr Josef Molsberger

(Emeritus Professor of Economic Policy,
University of Tübingen)

Professor David O'Keefe

(Founding Joint Editor)

Dr Jacek Saryusz-Wolski

(Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
European Parliament)

Ambassador Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent

(Former Permanent Representative of the Kingdom
of Belgium to the European Union)

Professor Loukas Tsoukalis

(University of Athens; President, Hellenic
Foundation for European and Foreign Policy
(ELIAMEP))

Lord Wallace of Saltaire

(House of Lords)

Professor Joseph H.H. Weiler

(New York University School of Law)

Prof. Dr Wolfgang Wessels

(University of Cologne)

Published by:
Kluwer Law International
P.O. Box 316
2400 AH Alphen aan den Rijn
The Netherlands

Sold and distributed in North, Central and South America by:
Aspen Publishers, Inc.
7201 McKinney Circle
Frederick, MD 21704
USA

In all other countries sold and distributed by:
Turpin Distribution Services
Stratton Business Park
Pegasus Drive
Biggleswade
Bedfordshire SG18 8TQ
United Kingdom

ISSN 1384-6299

©2011 Kluwer Law International BV

Print subscription prices, including postage (2012): EUR 399/USD 532/GBP 294.

Online subscription prices (2012): EUR 370/USD 493/GBP 271 (covers two concurrent users).

(2011) 16 EFA Rev. should be used to cite this volume.

This journal is available online at www.kluwerlaw.com.

Sample copies and other information are available at www.kluwerlaw.com.

For further information, please contact our sales department at +31 (0) 172 641562

or at sales@kluwerlaw.com.

For Marketing Opportunities please contact marketing@kluwerlaw.com.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publishers.

Permission to use this content must be obtained from the copyright owner. Please apply to: Wolters Kluwer Legal Permissions Department, 76 Ninth Avenue, 7th Floor, New York NY 10011-5201 United States.

E-mail: permissions@kluwerlaw.com.

Advancing Democracy on Difficult Terrain: EU Democracy Promotion in Central Asia

FABIENNE BOSSUYT* & PAUL KUBICEK**

Abstract. This article examines the substance of the EU's democracy promotion activities in Central Asia. Although agreeing with the literature that EU self-interest calculations have shaped aspects of the EU's democratization policy in Central Asia, this article argues that the importance of other explanatory factors needs to be highlighted – in particular, the importance of the 'domestic context'. In assuming that the substance of the EU's democracy promotion activities differs between regions and countries, the article asserts that the EU does so in accordance with the varying resonance in the respective target states. It hypothesizes that, *ceteris paribus*, the greater the targeted country's openness and commitment to political liberalization, the more the EU will aim to support externally embedded, that is, broad, liberal democracy. Conversely, the smaller the targeted country's openness and commitment to political liberalization, the less emphasis the EU will put on the core aspects of democracy and the more it will promote narrow or shallow democracy.

Using the embedded democracy framework, the article finds that the relatively varying resonance among the five countries corresponds – in some ways – to the substance promoted by the EU. While not providing a conclusive test of what matters most – that is, either strategic considerations or the advancement of democratic norms – the analysis ascertains that the EU is adjusting the substance of its democracy promotion in Central Asia with some eye to the particular context of each country. As such, the EU does more to promote 'broad' liberal democracy in Kyrgyzstan, the most open and politically liberal country in the region. In Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, the EU puts less emphasis on the core components of democracy but pays similar attention to the context conditions. In Uzbekistan, the EU tends to promote shallow democracy, as it focuses mostly on the context conditions of democracy. In Turkmenistan, the most repressive and authoritarian country in Central Asia, the EU is least assertive in pressing its democratization agenda, promoting, at best, only limited aspects of democracy.

* Fabienne Bossuyt, Assistant Professor at the Centre for EU Studies, Ghent University.

** Paul Kubicek, Professor at the Department of Political Science, Oakland University.

I Introduction

Democracy promotion in Central Asia has been on the EU's agenda since the very beginning of its engagement with the region in the early 1990s. However, despite the lofty rhetoric in EU policy documents and statements, democracy promotion in practice has appeared to be modest in scope and only of secondary importance in the EU's portfolio of policies towards the Central Asian republics, which has concentrated primarily on trade, security and (economic) regulatory issues. Only recently – and especially in light of the EU strategy for a new partnership with Central Asia launched in June 2007 – has the EU started to bolster its democratization efforts. Even so, the EU's democracy promotion policy remains subject to strong criticism, with observers and scholars alike denouncing the strategy as a trade-off between normative goals and strategic interests and arguing that it does not go far enough in pressing for genuine democratization.¹

Scholarly attention to the topic has so far focused predominantly on the instruments and strategies as well as the outcome and effectiveness of the EU's democracy promotion activities in Central Asia.² In this regard, the literature is univocal in claiming that the EU has had little impact on implementing a general transition in the region towards political liberalization and democracy. However, only scant attention has so far been paid to the very substance of the EU's democracy promotion efforts in Central Asia. Moreover, in searching for explanations of the limited scope of the EU's democracy promotion in the region, the literature has concentrated mainly on interest-based explanations, emphasizing the EU's energy and security interests in the Central Asian republics.³ In addition, these interest-focused arguments tend to approach Central Asia as a single entity in explaining the outcome of the EU's democracy promotion activities in the region, thereby

¹ See, e.g., A. Cooley, 'Principles in the Pipeline: Managing Transatlantic Values and Interests in Central Asia', *International Affairs* 84, no. 6 (2008): 1173–1188; G. Crawford, 'EU Human Rights and Democracy Promotion in Central Asia: From Lofty Principles to Lowly Self-interests', *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 9, no. 2 (2008): 172–191; B. Dave, 'The EU and Kazakhstan: Is the Pursuit of Energy and Security Cooperation Compatible with the Promotion of Human Rights and Democratic Reforms?', in *Engaging Central Asia: The European Union's New Strategy in the Heart of Eurasia*, ed. N.J. Melvin (Brussels: CEPS Paperbacks, 2008), 43–67; K. Hoffmann, 'The EU in Central Asia: Successful Good Governance Promotion?', *Third World Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (2010): 87–103; A. Warkotsch, 'The European Union's Democracy Promotion Approach in Central Asia: On the Right Track?', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 14, no.2 (2009): 249–269.

² Cooley, *supra* n. 1; Crawford, *supra* n. 1; E. Schatz, 'Access by Accident: Legitimacy Claims and Democracy Promotion in Authoritarian Central Asia', *International Political Science Review* 27, no. 3 (2006): 263–284; A. Warkotsch, 'The European Union and Democracy Promotion in Bad Neighbourhoods: The case of Central Asia', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 11, no. 3 (2006): 509–525; Warkotsch, 2009, *supra* n. 1.

³ See, e.g., Cooley, *supra* n. 1; Crawford, *supra* n. 1; Warkotsch, 2006, *supra* n. 2.

largely ignoring the considerable differences among the five countries, including their varying geo-economic and geo-political relevance for the EU. Although agreeing that EU self-interest calculations have shaped aspects of the EU's democratization policy in Central Asia, this article argues that the importance of other explanatory factors needs to be highlighted – in particular, the importance of the 'domestic context'. In short, the article seeks to demonstrate that the substance and scope of the EU's democracy promotion agenda in the region is the result not only of self-interest considerations but also of a reflection of the limited but also varied domestic resonance with the EU's calls for democratization.

In assuming that the substance of the EU's democracy promotion activities differs between regions and countries, the article asserts that the EU does so in accordance with the varying resonance in the respective target states. It hypothesizes that, *ceteris paribus*, the greater the targeted country's openness and commitment to political liberalization, the more the EU will aim to support externally embedded, that is, broad, liberal democracy (confer Type I as described in the introductory article). Conversely, the smaller the targeted country's openness and commitment to political liberalization, the less emphasis the EU will put on the core aspects of democracy and the more it will promote narrow (Types III and IV) or shallow (Type V) democracy. In summary, we expect the EU to adapt its democratization efforts in Central Asia with some eye to the particular context of the region and of each country. This expectation, which eschews a one-size-fits-all approach, is reflected in a 1998 Common Position issued by the Council, which declared that increased support for democracy is to be considered where 'positive changes have taken place and where the governments concerned are engaged in promoting positive change'.⁴ This corresponds with Carothers' argument of 'democratization producing democracy aid', insofar as 'democratic openings present opportunities for democracy promoters to get involved'.⁵

However, the tendency to increase democracy support in countries where prospects for democratization are more promising may be tempered or even absent if the EU has strong strategic, that is, economic and/or security, interests in the country concerned, as those interests may undermine the EU's commitment to political reform in the target state. In other words, one cannot wholly discount the role that material and strategic interests play in EU policy. In order to examine these factors, the article will also consider the EU's interests in the five respective countries.

The article is structured as follows. After this introductory section, it will highlight the 'domestic resonance' in Central Asia, assessing to what extent the EU's calls for democratization resonate – if at all – within the five target states.

⁴ Council of the European Union, 'Common Position Concerning Human Rights, Democratic Principles, the Rule of Law and Good Governance in Africa', 98/3501CFSP, Official Journal of the European Communities, L 158/1, 2 (June 1998).

⁵ T. Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 44–45.

Next, it will examine what sort of democratic substance the EU advocates in the region. To do so, the article will use the analytical model of ‘embedded democracy’ as presented in the introduction to this special issue. The final section will then compare and contrast the findings for each country, thereby exploring the ‘domestic context’ hypothesis – that is, whether the EU promotes broad liberal democracy in countries that are more open and more committed to political liberalization and narrow or shallow democracy in countries where resonance with its calls for democratization is very low. In doing so, the article will examine whether the variation in the substance of the EU’s democracy promotion among the five target states corresponds with the varying resonance pattern in the respective countries.

II The Discouraging Domestic Context for Democratization in Central Asia

A cursory examination of political systems in Central Asia – the ostensible targets of EU democracy promotion efforts – leads to one unmistakable conclusion: the region suffers from an acute democratic deficit. By any number of measures – those of Freedom House, the World Bank, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, and the Polity datasets – the states of Central Asia rank among the least liberal, open and democratic in the world. With the exception of Kyrgyzstan, which at one time was touted as an ‘island of democracy’ in the region,⁶ this has held true throughout Central Asian countries’ experience as independent states. Any number of explanations – historical, cultural, socio-economic, elite dynamics, external environment – can be invoked, indicating that the region’s authoritarian regimes are ‘over-determined’.⁷ Hence, resonance with Western-style democratization is likely to be low, although with some variation among the five countries.

1. Central Asia as Difficult Terrain for Democratic Development

The first set of factors that makes Central Asia a poor environment for Western-style democratization is economic: high levels of poverty and an economic structure that leaves the most valuable resources in the hands of political elites. Years of research have confirmed a core hypothesis most famously elaborated by Lipset: the connection between economic development and democracy.⁸ In this vein, prosperity is often assumed to be either a pre-requisite for the establishment of democracy or a factor that helps embed it and contribute to its stability. By this reasoning, Central

⁶ J. Anderson, *Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia’s Island of Democracy* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1999).

⁷ P. Kubicek, ‘Applying the Democratization Literature to Post-Soviet Central Asian Statehood’, in *Stable Outside, Fragile Outside?: Post-Soviet Statehood in Central Asia*, ed. E. Kavalski (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2010).

⁸ S.M. Lipset, *Political Man. The Social Basis of Politics* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1960).

Asia does not seem to be a particularly propitious environment for democracy, with large numbers of Central Asians subsisting on less than USD 2 per day. However, there is one outlier: Kazakhstan, which was well integrated into the Soviet industrial economy and which has experienced sizeable growth since the late 1990s. Its level of development would seem to make it more fertile ground for democratization. However, Kazakhstan's relative economic strength also makes it less susceptible to external pressure (confer the power structure as independent variable; see the introductory article of this special issue) than the poorer countries in the region, in particular, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which rely strongly on foreign assistance.⁹

Mention should also be made of the political economy in the region. While the overall inequality indicators for most Central Asian states compare favourably with those of other targets of EU democracy assistance (yet still high by continental European standards), control over the most valuable resources in Central Asia – hydrocarbons, pipelines, mines, power generation, and large industrial enterprises – is subject to neo-patrimonial or patronage politics, largely controlled by the president and his immediate family and clan. These patronage pyramids have been attributed to various factors: a hold-over of Soviet times, a result of economic shortages and an over-reliance of natural resources in the country's economic profile, weakness of formal political institutions, and cultural practices in the region that pre-date Soviet rule.¹⁰ 'Clan politics' works against democracy in numerous ways, as it rests upon unelected and unaccountable informal institutions, shuts off would-be rivals from economic (and thereby political) resources, and often operates in opposition to the rule of law. However, there are again differences in the region. For example, Kazakhstan's lucrative oil exports give its leaders more resources to build up strong patronage networks. Conversely, leaders in states without such resources, as in Kyrgyzstan, may therefore be more politically vulnerable and less able to construct strong authoritarian edifices.¹¹

Another factor that makes Central Asia a difficult terrain for Western-style democratization is the relative weakness of civil society. True, a variety of organizations, often linked to *mahallas* (local neighbourhoods), guilds and *waqfs* (foundations) have emerged in the region, often providing social services to people in need. One UN report on civil society in Tajikistan, however, suggested that focus on 'service delivery' functions – at times contracted by the state itself – may mean that 'civil society's contribution to good governance may remain unclaimed'.¹²

⁹ For example, according to the World Bank (www.worldbank.org), GNP/capita in 2009 was USD 7,257 in Kazakhstan, compared with only USD 860 in Kyrgyzstan and USD 716 in Tajikistan. In 2008, foreign aid in Kazakhstan amounted to only 0.3% of its national income, compared with 7.1% in Kyrgyzstan and 5.7% in Tajikistan.

¹⁰ The premier source on clans in Central Asia is K. Collins, *Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

¹¹ P. Kubicek, 'Are Central Asian Leaders Learning from Upheavals in Kyrgyzstan?', *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 2:2 (July 2011), 115–124.

¹² United Nations Development Programme, 'Civil Society and Human Development in Tajikistan' (2007), 3, at <http://cfapp1-docs-public.undp.org/evaldocs1/adr/eo_doc_597030542.pdf>.

Moreover, because of the dominance of clan structures and patronage politics, many associations (e.g., trade unions and business groups) are more interested in becoming a part of the system than pressing for political change. Many groups also tend to be apolitical and small in size, often more interested in working for and obtaining funds from international partners than pressing an agenda against their Central Asian governments.¹³ Those associations that do advocate on more political issues such as human rights have found themselves repressed (as in the case of ‘Sunny Uzbekistan’ in 2005–2006) or marginalized (as in the case of the state-initiated National Commission for Democratization and Civil Society in Kazakhstan in 2004). Even in Kyrgyzstan, the country with arguably the most vibrant civil society, non-governmental organizations, particularly Western-backed ones, have faced harassment from the government – yet not to the extent as elsewhere in the region – and were, according to some observers, relatively marginal in fostering political mobilization during the upheavals in 2005 and 2010.¹⁴

A final factor that makes the region an inauspicious environment for democratic development is problems of stateness and nation building. Issues of ‘state-ness’ are likely to be most acute in new states, such as those in Central Asia. Some observers have even drawn parallels between Central Asian states and those in post-colonial Africa, remarking upon how both had to construct a new order with an institutional inheritance that provided economic and social problems and a weak state capacity to help solve them.¹⁵ Examples of problems of stateness are numerous: attempts by the ruling elites to construct national mythologies to foster identification with the state¹⁶; the 1992–1997 civil war in Tajikistan; sporadic ethnic violence between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan that reached new heights in 2010; political violence in Uzbekistan; and, as noted above, the persistence of corruption, personalism and ‘clan politics’ that work against democratization, national unity and state capacity. It is not surprising, therefore, that most Central Asian states – Kazakhstan being the largest exception – score very low on the World Bank’s Governance Indicators on political stability, government effectiveness and the rule of law, which touch upon aspects of stateness and state capacity.¹⁷ Across the region, fears of state disintegration due to ethnic, regional and clan divisions have been used by political elites to

¹³ C. Buxton, ‘NGO Networks in Central Asia and Global Civil Society: Potential and Limitations’, *Central Asian Survey* 28, no. 1 (2009): 43–58.

¹⁴ S. Radnitz, *Weapons of the Wealthy: Predatory Regimes and Elite-Led Protests in Central Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).

¹⁵ See, e.g., Collins, *supra* n. 10.

¹⁶ For an example, see E. Marat, ‘Imagined Past, Uncertain Future: The Creation of National Ideologies in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’, *Problems of Post-Communism* 55, no. 1 (2008): 12–24.

¹⁷ The four respective states typically feature in the bottom fifth of all countries in the World Bank Governance Indicators rankings, online at: <<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>>.

argue *against* political liberalization and *for* more centralized control to serve as guarantors of stability.

In summary, a general anxiety about how democratization might threaten their position, as well as an interest in preserving patronage networks and a more personalized approach to politics, makes Central Asian elites very reluctant partners when it comes to the EU's democratization activities. Indeed, given the various constraints on democratization, one would expect little resonance with the EU's democratization agenda.

III Ascertaining Motives for Limited Democratic Substance

As is clear from the above discussion, Central Asia, for the most part, offers an inauspicious environment for liberal democratization. The question that interests us then is whether and to what extent the EU accounts for this limited resonance in the substance of its democratization policies in Central Asia. However, given that Central Asian countries display some variance in the level of political liberalization and openness, willingness to cooperate with the EU on democratic norms and political reforms might be expected to be higher in some countries, in which cases we may expect the EU to focus more on 'broad' liberal democracy (Type I as described in the introductory article of this issue) instead of 'narrow' (Types III and IV) or 'shallow democracy' (Type V) and thus to emphasize both the core elements of democracy and the context conditions. Even so, the tendency to increase democracy support in countries where prospects for democratization are more promising may be tempered or even absent if the EU has strong strategic, that is, economic and/or security, interests in the country concerned, as those interests may undermine the EU's commitment to democracy support. The remainder of this section, therefore, looks at the variation among the countries both in terms of their domestic resonance with calls for democratization and in terms of the EU's strategic interests.

1. *Variation in the Level of Domestic Resonance across the Region*

The authoritarian regimes in Central Asia can be distinguished with regard to openness and political liberalization. Indeed, while Turkmenistan's and Uzbekistan's regimes rank as dictatorial and extremely repressive, Kazakhstan's and Tajikistan's tend to be a bit 'softer', at times relying more on co-optation than outright coercion. Kyrgyzstan, in turn, has had moments of more substantial political liberalization coupled with popular uprisings linked to attempts by Presidents Askar Akaev (1991–2005) and Kurmanbek Bakiev (2005–2010) to impose stronger presidential rule. Within Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have had perhaps the best prospects for democratization – Kyrgyzstan

because of a relatively high degree of political freedom, pluralism and an active civil society and Kazakhstan because of its level of economic development and a willingness of the political elite to offer (at times) some support for political liberalization, as exemplified by President Nazarbayev's 'Path to Europe' and the country's Chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Nothing of this sort can be found in either Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, while Tajikistan has been beset by so many political, security and economic challenges that its prospects for democracy are extremely constrained. Importantly, Kyrgyzstan has been the only Central Asian country to experience what might be called 'democratic openings', that is, the 2005 'Tulip Revolution' and the overthrow of Bakiev's increasingly authoritarian government in 2010.¹⁸

In summary, domestic resonance with EU calls for democratization appears strongest in Kyrgyzstan, with noticeably more limited resonance in Kazakhstan. Tajikistan arguably comes next, although its willingness to cooperate with the EU is strongly linked to its high level of aid dependence.¹⁹ Resonance is very low in Uzbekistan and even lower in dictatorial Turkmenistan, despite the country's leadership change following the death of President Niyazov in 2006. In accordance with the 'domestic context' hypothesis and Carothers' argument of 'democratization producing democracy aid', we may thus expect the EU to focus more (at least in relative terms) on 'broad' liberal democracy in Kyrgyzstan than in other countries and, in addition, to be the most assertive in Kyrgyzstan in pressing its democratization agenda. In contrast, we may expect the EU to be least assertive in Turkmenistan, where it is expected to promote only very limited democracy.

2. *Variation in the Countries' Strategic Importance for the EU*

The Central Asian states differ on variables related to their strategic importance for the EU. A first difference concerns their size and resource endowments, which arguably affect the ability of outside actors to encourage political change, as these determine their bargaining power (confer the power structure as independent variable; see the introductory article). That is, the states that are larger (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) and/or have hydrocarbon resources (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) are, *ceteris paribus*, less susceptible to outside pressure than the smaller states with fewer natural resources, notably Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are also more dependent on foreign assistance.

¹⁸ In the wake of constitutional reforms and October 2010 elections in Kyrgyzstan that were judged free and fair by outside observers, Kyrgyzstan may emerge – again – as an oasis in an authoritarian desert. However, given the political and ethnic violence in the spring of 2010, it is far from certain that political stability, let alone democracy, is assured.

¹⁹ Interview at the European Commission, DG DEVCO, in Brussels on 18 Jan. 2011.

Kazakhstan is the largest state in the region in terms of surface; its leaders have ambitions to make the country an important regional power; it is far wealthier than the other countries; it has more extensive trade ties with the EU than other Central Asian states; and it is important not only geopolitically but also as a net oil exporter. Similarly, the EU has a considerable interest in Turkmenistan because of the country's vast gas reserves, with plans afoot to construct pipelines to ship Turkmen gas directly to Europe. In contrast, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have no fossil energy resources and are much poorer and smaller but are relatively important in terms of EU security concerns (i.e., for the NATO operation in neighbouring Afghanistan). Uzbekistan, in turn, is the most populous and most centrally located country in Central Asia, which implies *inter alia* that the country is crucial for the EU strategy for Central Asia to succeed. In addition, Uzbekistan has some gas reserves and, more importantly, hosts a German military base, which is used for the NATO operation in Afghanistan. Another security interest, which applies to all five countries in more or less equal amounts, is the EU's fear of instability in the region, linked *inter alia* to the countries' vicinity to Afghanistan, their predominantly Muslim population and the regimes' authoritarian nature.²⁰

Based on the varying strategic importance of the respective countries (confer the EU's interests in the third country as independent variable; see the introductory article of this issue),²¹ one can imagine the following outcome for the substance of the EU's democracy promotion: the EU will promote broader democratic substance in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan than in other countries, because there are fewer potentially competing strategic interests at stake. The EU will thus be less assertive in its push for democratization in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, where its stronger interests are expected to trump its democratization goals and to soft pedal democratization. However, if we also consider the domestic resonance pattern, then the EU will promote broader liberal democracy in Kazakhstan than in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, because the domestic context in Kazakhstan is – to some extent – more promising. For the same reason, the EU should also be more assertive in this regard in Kyrgyzstan than in Tajikistan. Thus, while not providing a conclusive test of what matters most – that is, either strategic considerations or the advancement of democratic norms – the analysis should allow us to ascertain whether the EU is adjusting the substance of its democracy promotion in Central Asia with some eye to the particular context of each country.

²⁰ See, e.g., Cooley, *supra* n. 1; Crawford, *supra* n. 1; Dave, *supra* n. 1.

²¹ According to this expectation, the more the EU–third country relationship is characterized by EU or EU Member State economic or security interests, the more the EU will promote limited or shallow democracy (Types III, IV and V).

IV Substance of EU Democracy Promotion in Central Asia

As pointed out above, only recently – and especially in light of the EU strategy for a new partnership with Central Asia launched in June 2007 – has the EU started to bolster its democratization effort. Starting from this observation, what kind of democracy is being advanced through its cooperation and assistance initiatives in Central Asia? To examine what sort of democratic substance the EU advocates in the Central Asian republics, we use the embedded democracy framework. In concrete terms, this means that we will analyse whether and to what extent the EU promotes the ‘core aspects of democracy’, as compared with the ‘external conditions’, that is, issues that are not among the defining components of democracy but that affect its sustainability and quality.²² While the latter comprise stateness, civil society and socio-economic requisites, the core aspects of democracy (or what Merkel calls ‘partial regimes’) consist of a democratic electoral regime, political rights of participation, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and the guarantee that the effective power to govern lies in the hands of democratically elected representatives.²³ In what follows, these aspects are first explored for the EU’s cooperation and assistance policies towards the region more generally and then for the EU’s programmes towards the respective countries.

1. *What Substance of EU Democracy Promotion in Central Asia?*

In examining the EU’s current engagement with the region, it is important to distinguish between, on the one hand, the EU strategy for a new partnership with Central Asia, that is, the political strategy launched in 2007, and, on the other, the European Commission’s regional assistance strategy for Central Asia, which sets out the goals and guidelines for the assistance in 2007–2013. In the EU Strategy for a new partnership with Central Asia, ‘the development of transparent, democratic political structures’, together with the rule of law, human rights and good governance, is presented as one of the six priority areas for cooperation with the region, the other five priority areas being education; economic development, trade and investment; energy and transport links; environmental sustainability and water; and security issues.²⁴ In outlining the contents of cooperation on this priority area, the strategy focuses predominantly on the protection of human rights and the creation of an independent judiciary, aimed at ‘making a sustainable contribution to the establishment of structures based on the rule of

²² W. Merkel, ‘Embedded and Defective Democracies’, *Democratization* 11 no. 5 (2004): 44. Also see the introductory article of this special issue.

²³ Merkel, *supra* n. 22, 36–48. Also see the introductory article of this issue.

²⁴ Council of the European Union, ‘European Union and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership’ (Brussels: General Secretariat of the Council, 2007), 12.

law and international human rights standards'.²⁵ Central to these purposes are the human rights dialogues held with each of the five countries and the EU Rule of Law Initiative, implemented by the Member States in cooperation with the Commission. While attention is paid to the 'partial regimes' of civil rights and horizontal accountability, only little emphasis is placed on the promotion of a democratic electoral regime and political rights of participation, with only some vague references to the importance of independent media for the development of a pluralistic society and close coordination and/or cooperation with the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Council of Europe's Venice Commission.²⁶

Similar to the EU's political strategy, the European Commission's 2007–2013 regional assistance strategy for Central Asia highlights the promotion of democratization, human rights and good governance, including the strengthening of public institutions, as a priority of bilateral assistance with the countries.²⁷ When looking at the indicative allocations of the bilateral assistance for the period 2007–2013, it quickly becomes apparent that the focus is much more on the promotion of good governance and the socio-economic requisites for democracy than on democratic transition in the narrower sense. For 2007–2013, good governance programmes – together with economic reform programmes – are allocated 20% to 25% of the total budget.²⁸ Interestingly, many of the good governance programmes appear to target the issue of 'stateness' and, in particular, national and local administrative capacity and management. It is important to note that certain core aspects of democracy, such as political rights of participation, are promoted through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which falls under a separate budget line. However, as we will see in more detail below, the EIDHR is not used for all five countries. Moreover, the funding allocated to the region under this instrument is relatively limited compared with the funding for democratization activities provided under the Development and Cooperation Instrument.²⁹

In turn, receiving the highest amount of funding is the focal sector of poverty reduction (i.e., 40%–45% of the total budget),³⁰ an area which the strategy paper explicitly links to the EU's goal of democratization, clearly suggesting the importance that the EU attaches in Central Asia to the promotion of the socio-economic requisites for democratization:

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 12–14.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 14.

²⁷ European Commission, 'European Community Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the Period 2007–13' (Brussels: 2007), 27.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁹ In 2011, for instance, only EUR 1.5 million is allocated to the region under the EIDHR instrument, at <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/human-rights/documents/mip_eidhr_2011-2013_for_publication2_en.pdf>.

³⁰ European Commission, *supra* n. 27, at 3.

It is the EU's firm belief that the first priority of assistance must be to help each of the five Republics to eradicate poverty and to improve the living standards, education and job opportunities of their respective populations. In this way, the EU will enable the states of Central Asia to complete their political and economic transition, and thus to consolidate broader values of democracy, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights and decent work on which sustainable development must be built.³¹

In a similar vein, although poverty reduction as such is not mentioned as a goal in the EU's political strategy, education is singled out in the political strategy as one of the six priority areas for cooperation, aimed specifically at the modernization of the education sector in the Central Asian republics.³² The importance of education as a focal sector is also reflected in the Commission's indicative budget for assistance to the region. In the period 2011–2013, education (together with science and people-to-people projects) is allocated EUR 45 million, compared with only EUR 25 million for energy-related projects, that is, also one of the six priority areas for cooperation, and EUR 10 million for security-related programmes (including border management and anti-drugs trafficking), that is, another one of the six priority fields.³³ This comparison of the indicative allocations leads to the provisional insight that the promotion of socio-economic requisites of democracy, in particular, poverty reduction and education, is valued more than the pursuit of strategic (energy and security) interests, suggesting that interest-based calculations might be less determinant for the EU's Central Asia policy than generally held in the literature.

Both the EU's political strategy and the assistance strategy paper explicitly point to the importance of taking into account the countries' specific situation. While a regional approach was originally considered more adequate than a country-specific approach, the last ten years have seen a gradual acknowledgement by the EU that the substantial differences among the five countries required a larger focus on the national level to the point where 70% of the financial means for Central Asia are now allocated to bilateral programmes implemented at the national level. As such, the Commission's strategy paper emphasizes 'the need for a differentiated approach depending on the context and the particular needs of individual states'.³⁴ That this context-specific approach is also applied to the formulation of the content of its democratization activities is made clear by an EU official, who indicated that the democratic substance promoted in Central Asia, while based on sort of a EU template of liberal democratic values promoted around the world, 'is not a copy-paste of these democratic values; it takes into

³¹ European Commission, *supra* n. 27, at 7.

³² Council of the European Union, 2007, *supra* n. 24, at 15.

³³ European Commission, 'Central Asia DCI Indicative Programme 2011–2013' (Brussels, 2010), 14–15.

³⁴ European Commission, *supra* n. 27, at 6.

account the region's and countries' specificities and particularities'.³⁵ Moreover, that the EU considers the states' commitment to reform is obvious in the political strategy, which specifies that '[t]he intensity of the cooperation will reflect the commitment to transition and reform of each country'.³⁶

Based on this cursory examination of the main EU policy documents for Central Asia, it is already apparent that – rather than promoting democratic transition in the formal, narrow sense – the EU seems to favour a long-term approach to democratization in the region, with particular attention to the promotion of 'good governance' and, especially, 'stateness', and the socio-economic requisites of democracy, thereby taking into account the countries' distinct political and social realities. In short, rather than promoting – in Merkel's terms – the 'partial regimes', the EU seems to be focusing instead on the external conditions or prerequisites that might, over the long term, be able to develop in such a way that political liberalization, if not complete democratization, becomes more of a possibility.

Let us now further explore these preliminary findings and have a more in-depth look at the substance of the democratization programmes for the five countries in order to examine to what extent the democratic substance differs among the respective states.

2. Varying Substance of EU Democracy Promotion among the Central Asian States

As noted above, many of the EU's 'good governance' programmes for Central Asia appear to target the issue of stateness, notably by promoting strong and accountable institutions and a political commitment to effective management of the state. Since the early 2000s, the EU has indeed been providing considerable assistance across the region for capacity-building projects in view of effective and efficient management of public administration – both at the national and the local level – which it has consistently linked to its wider objective of fostering reform and contributing to a stable political framework and functioning economic structures. However, while this overall goal applies to the region as a whole, the actual action radius of the EU's institutional and administrative capacity-building activities differ markedly among the five target countries. However, as we will see below in the case of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the differentiation also reflects a consideration of the country-specific limits within which the EU can encounter difficulties in advancing such sensitive reforms as government accountability, decentralization, and transparency of the public sector.

In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the two poorest states, the key focus of the EU's institutional capacity-building activities have been on poverty reduction policies,

³⁵ Interview in Brussels on 14 Jan. 2011.

³⁶ Council of the European Union, 2007, *supra* n. 24, at 11.

particularly through the Food Security Programme, which has provided social sector-oriented budget support and technical assistance for public finance management. More generally, next to its capacity-building efforts in the context of poverty reduction programmes, contributing to democratic development through the improvement of governance and the enhancement of capacity of the civil service and public administration, is an important focus of EU assistance to the two countries.

In Kazakhstan, which is much more advanced, such capacity-building initiatives occupy an even larger part of the EU's assistance. Compared with other EU democracy promotion activities in the country – including support for civil society support and independent media – support for public sector reform and modernization in Kazakhstan has attracted considerable funding from the EU over the last decade.³⁷ This trend has been even enhanced, up to the point where the promotion of good governance, and in particular stateness, currently dominates the EU's bilateral assistance for the country: in 2011–2013, the latter consists of support for regional development and local governance, which is allocated EUR 8 million, judicial reform (EUR 10 million) and enhancement of public service capabilities for social and economic reforms (EUR 12 million).³⁸ Assistance for public administration and civil service reform currently focuses on four sectors, that is, education, agriculture, industry/innovation and environment.³⁹ An important scheme in this regard is the Policy Dialogue and Advice Programme, which is designed to establish a close policy dialogue by means of exchanging expertise, best practice and know-how.

In Uzbekistan, capacity-building efforts have been concentrated mostly in the economic and financial policy sphere *inter alia* through the Policy Advice Programme, which offers ad hoc policy advice to high-level decision-makers. Activities have included support for reforms in customs, treasury, tax administration and national statistics reform. There is little to suggest that the EU is promoting core elements of democracy at the national level. However, it does support some efforts to improve accountability and popular participation at the local level, including at the level of the '*mahallas*',⁴⁰ which the EU has experienced as being more accessible and flexible than Uzbekistan's central government. The EU does this mostly through the Institution Building Partnership Programme (IBPP), which is designed to support institution-building processes through partnership cooperation between non-governmental organizations and

³⁷ European Union Delegation to Kazakhstan, 'Fifteen Years of Partnership and Cooperation' (Astana: 2010), 42.

³⁸ European Commission, *supra* n. 33, at 16.

³⁹ European Commission, 'Annual Action Programme for Kazakhstan 2010', Action fiche No. 1, at <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2010/af_aap_2010_kaz.pdf>.

⁴⁰ The Mahalla is a local social institute developed through social relations. It is used as a long-standing network between the state and families living in a geographical area. The Mahalla also takes up important social functions, including looking after local social and economic problems.

local/regional authorities and to strengthen local decision-making networks. A similar scheme – although currently only implemented in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – is the Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development (NSA-LA), which is aimed *inter alia* at strengthening capacities and involvement of local government in policy-making.

In Turkmenistan, in turn, institutional and administrative capacity-building activities by the EU have remained rather limited, but not absent. So far, capacity-building efforts have focused mostly on reform in the legal sector, aimed at institutional strengthening and legal capacity-building, particularly in the field of international law. However, the EU's promotion of legal reform and judicial development has been much more substantive in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In Kazakhstan, activities have included support for notary reform, institutional development of the court system (i.e., providing assistance in establishing a jury system, the institution of the bailiff and access to legal information for the public), support to the Judicial Academy, as well as strengthening of the office of the Ombudsman.⁴¹ The fact that the main goal of these projects is to improve the independence of the judiciary suggests that this particular aspect of 'horizontal accountability' takes up an important role in the democratic substance that the EU promotes in the country. However, one should note that this goal is also linked to the EU's concern with improving Kazakhstan's investment climate, making it more attractive for foreign (not least European) investors – a reflection of the country's strategic value.⁴² Legal and judicial reform is also a focal priority of the EU's assistance to Kyrgyzstan, where its objective is to ensure progress in the capacity and independence of the judiciary, thereby guaranteeing impartiality and effectiveness of prosecution. As in Kazakhstan, the goal is to improve transparency and accountability of the state.⁴³ Interestingly, however, in Kyrgyzstan, the EU's promotion of horizontal accountability – and of civil rights – goes markedly further, notably by also targeting the Parliament. This is evidenced *inter alia* in a project launched in 2008, which has provided assistance 'aimed at strengthening the Kyrgyz Parliament and helping it to fulfil its core functions – law-making, oversight and representation, as well as contributing to improved rule of law in the Kyrgyz Republic with a view to fully operational democratic society'.⁴⁴ Moreover, since the overthrow of the Kyrgyz regime in April 2010, the EU's support for political reform in the country has further increased. Indeed, in the aftermath of the April events, the EU called on the Instrument for Stability to provide assistance in support of democratic transition, helping the country with

⁴¹ European Commission, 'Annual Action Programme 2007, Action Fiche for Kazakhstan', 1–2.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ European Commission, 'Annual Action Plan for Central Asia 2010', at <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2010/af_aap_2010_central-asia_p3.pdf>.

⁴⁴ EU Delegation to Kyrgyzstan, 'Project Fiche', at <http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/kyrgyzstan/projects/list_of_projects/projects_en.htm>.

designing and implementing legislative and constitutional reform.⁴⁵ The EU also provided electoral support at the parliamentary elections in October 2010 and has committed to doing this again at the forthcoming presidential elections. Interestingly, while the EU also supports the institutional strengthening of Uzbekistan's and Turkmenistan's national parliaments, these projects are much more superficial.

Other core aspects of democracy – in particular, political rights of participation and civil rights – are promoted primarily through the EIDHR. Assistance under EIDHR is divided into three categories: (i) combating torture, xenophobia, minority and ethnic discrimination; (ii) human rights; and (iii) supporting the democratic process, with funding spread more or less equally across the three areas.⁴⁶ In Kyrgyzstan, for instance, projects currently funded via this instrument include torture prevention, youth rights inclusion and political engagement and monitoring of custody conditions.⁴⁷ In Kazakhstan, which has so far hosted the largest number of EIDHR projects, several recent activities have focused on freedom of the press and the existence of independent media, among other things. At the regional level, EIDHR currently funds the project 'EU–Central Asia Rule of Law Initiative', led by the Council of Europe's Venice Commission. As part of the EU's wider rule of law programme for the region, the project supports further development of constitutional mechanisms aimed at strengthening the principles of rule of law, separation of powers and legal certainty; seeks to enhance the efficiency and independence of the judiciary; and provides assistance in the reform of the institution of public prosecution and other investigative bodies as well as in the reform of electoral systems and improvement of election administration.⁴⁸ However, the EIDHR has hardly been used for Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The only project under EIDHR implemented in Turkmenistan so far is a BBC World Service Trust activity, entitled 'Shaping the Future of the Turkmen Media in the Post-Niyazov Thaw'.⁴⁹ The indicative allocations of EIDHR reveal that, in 2011, only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan received direct funding under this instrument, notably EUR 600,000 and EUR 900,000, respectively.⁵⁰

However, these indicative allocations exclude EIDHR funding earmarked for the above-mentioned joint Rule of Law project with the Venice Commission, as well as the recently introduced national civil society seminars. The latter are to be

⁴⁵ Interview at the European Commission, *supra* n. 19.

⁴⁶ European Commission, 'EIDHR', at <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/eidhr_en.htm>.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ European Commission, 'List of EIDHR Projects funded in 2009', at <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/humanrights/documents/contracts_table_2009_for_publication_for_website_en.pdf>; European Commission, 'Annual Action Programme for Central Asia 2010', at <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2010/af_aap_2010_central-asia_p3.pdf>.

⁴⁹ European Commission, *supra* n. 48.

⁵⁰ European Commission, *supra* n. 29.

organized annually on the occasion of the bilateral human rights dialogue held with each of the Central Asian states. Again, however, Turkmenistan appears a 'reluctant' partner, in that it has not yet allowed the organization of a civil society seminar. While the civil society seminars are aimed at promoting discussion between European and Central Asian state and non-state actors on the issue of human rights, the human right dialogues – held at foreign ministerial level – seek to foster enhanced respect for human rights by the Central Asian regimes.

The latter indicates that the EU does not only promote civil rights through the provision of technical assistance but also through cooperation instruments under its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In fact, the EU has used a range of CFSP instruments in relation to democracy promotion in Central Asia. Crawford, for instance, has calculated that between 2005 and 2007, nearly twenty CFSP statements were issued in relations to political events or developments in Central Asian countries, including elections, court cases and legislative acts.⁵¹ In addition, one 'common position' has so far been adopted, notably after the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan in 2005. As pointed out by Crawford:

although CFSP declarations or 'statements' are used to commend actions, for example, progress towards the abolition of the death penalty in Kyrgyzstan (9 January 2006), the majority are critical in tone and used to rebuke abuses of civil and political rights and draw attention to flawed electoral processes.⁵²

It is worth noting that, despite being the least democratic country in the region, Turkmenistan has so far not attracted any such EU declarations.

The fact that the EU has not yet made any such statements in relation to domestic developments in Turkmenistan further adds to the finding that the EU hardly attempts to promote democracy in the country. In part, these limited efforts are in response to the country's extremely low resonance with calls for democratization.⁵³ However, it cannot be denied that the EU's lack of assertiveness in pushing a democratization agenda in Turkmenistan is also linked to its considerable strategic interests in the country, which the EU knows would risk being impaired if it expressed more explicit democratization demands. In a similar vein, albeit to a lesser extent, the EU will often times refrain from increasing pressure on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan because it cannot afford isolating them. At the same time, however, the fact that the EU promotes more limited democracy in Uzbekistan than in Kazakhstan corresponds with the resonance pattern in these two countries: resonance with EU calls for democratization is lower in Uzbekistan than in Kazakhstan. Moreover, the domestic context

⁵¹ Crawford, *supra* n. 1, at 176–177.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ Interview in Brussels, *supra* n. 35.

hypothesis is further confirmed when contrasting the substance of EU democracy promotion in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. While the EU's strategic interests in both countries are relatively comparable, the democratic substance it advocates in Tajikistan is more limited than in Kyrgyzstan, where the EU puts more emphasis on the core aspects of democracy, simply because it sees more opportunities for the advancement of liberal democracy.⁵⁴

Returning to the EU's promotion of 'context conditions' of democracy, we have already seen that the promotion of stateness appears an inherent part of the EU's democratization agenda for the region – and in particular, in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – and to a lesser extent in Uzbekistan, where the EU has in many ways been held at arms length. As for civil society, in addition to the above-mentioned seminars, the EU also supports the IBPP and the NSA-LA programmes, which are both aimed at fostering an inclusive and empowered society in order to strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations and to facilitate interaction between state and non-state actors. However, in relative terms – and judging from the financial allocations – the EU is putting considerably more effort into advancing the socio-economic context for democracy, in particular, by targeting poverty reduction and education. As indicated above, the main focal sector of bilateral assistance is poverty reduction, which the strategy paper explicitly links to the EU's goal of democratization. Poverty reduction activities appear particularly prevalent in the assistance to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the two poorest countries, and to a lesser extent for Uzbekistan, where poverty reduction assistance mainly concentrates on raising living standards in rural areas. Education, in turn, appears to be a focal area of the EU's assistance in all five countries, with a strong focus on higher education. Each of the Central Asian countries participates in the EU's Erasmus Mundus and the Tempus programmes and cooperates with the EU on reform of the vocational education sector.

V Conclusion: Democratic Substance Adjusted to Domestic Resonance?

This article has sought to examine whether and to what extent the EU accounts for the limited resonance in Central Asia with the EU's democratization agenda when formulating the substance of its democracy promotion activities in the region. Based on the 'domestic context' hypothesis, we expected the EU to put little emphasis on the core aspects of democracy, and hence not to target democracy *in toto* or in Merkel's terms 'externally embedded liberal democracy' and instead to promote narrow or shallow democracy (confer Types III, IV and V in Figure 2 in the introductory article of this special issue). However, in countries

⁵⁴ Interview at the European Commission, *supra* n. 19.

where there is more willingness to cooperate with the EU on democratic norms and political reforms, we expected the EU to focus more on ‘broad’ liberal democracy, emphasizing both the core elements of democracy as well as the underlying context conditions. Even so, the latter tendency might be tempered or even absent if the EU has strong strategic and/or security interests in the target country, as these may be expected to outweigh the EU’s commitment to democracy support and political reform in the target country. Therefore, the article also considered the variation in EU interests among the five countries.

The analysis largely confirmed the general expectations regarding the substance of EU democracy promotion based on the domestic context hypothesis. Applying the resonance argument for the region as a whole, our examination of the main EU policy documents for Central Asia indicated that rather than promoting democratic transition in the formal, narrow sense as conceptualized by Merkel’s use of ‘partial regimes’, the EU seems to favour a long-term approach to democratization in the region, which takes into account the limited resonance in the region with calls for liberal democratization. Indeed, much more than on the core aspects of democracy, the EU focuses on the external conditions or prerequisites that might, over the long term, be able to develop in such a way that democratization becomes more of a possibility.

In turn, as summarized in Table 1, when moving beyond the regional level and examining the substance of the EU’s democracy promotion efforts in the individual countries, the article found that the relatively varying resonance among the five countries corresponds – in some ways – to the substance promoted by the EU. While not providing a conclusive test of what matters most – that is, either strategic considerations or the advancement of democratic norms – the analysis allowed us to ascertain that the EU is adjusting the substance of its democracy promotion in Central Asia with some eye to the particular context of each country. As such, we found that, in accordance with the ‘domestic context’ hypothesis, the EU does

Table 1 Ascertaining Motives of Substance of EU Democracy Promotion in Central Asia

	Kazakhstan	Turkmenistan	Uzbekistan	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan
EU interests: Energy– Security	+ +	+ +	– +	– +	– +
Political liberalization	Weak to medium	Very weak	Very weak	Medium	Weak
Democratic substance promoted by the EU	Some elements of broad liberal democracy	Elements of narrow democracy	Shallow democracy	Broad liberal democracy	Some elements of broad liberal democracy

more to promote 'broad' liberal democracy in Kyrgyzstan, the most open and politically liberal country in the region than in the other four countries. In Kyrgyzstan, the EU indeed concentrates both on the various partial regimes of democracy (e.g., horizontal accountability, civil rights and electoral democracy) and on the context conditions that embed democracy (socio-economic development, education and stateness). In Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, the EU only promotes some elements of broad liberal democracy. Although the EU advances some of the core aspects of democracy, including civil rights and legal reforms, in these two countries, it puts less emphasis on the core components of democracy than in Kyrgyzstan but pays similar attention to the context conditions, including socio-economic development (Tajikistan) and stateness (Kazakhstan). In Uzbekistan, in turn, the EU tends to promote shallow democracy, as it focuses mostly on the context conditions of democracy. Finally, in Turkmenistan, the EU is least assertive in pressing its democratization agenda, promoting, at best, only limited aspects of democracy.

AIMS

The aim of the *Review* is to consider the external posture of the European Union in its relations with the rest of the world. Therefore the *Review* will focus on the political, legal and economic aspects of the Union's external relations. The *Review* will function as an interdisciplinary medium for the understanding and analysis of foreign affairs issues which are of relevance to the European Union and its Member States on the one hand and its international partners on the other. The *Review* will aim at meeting the needs of both the academic and the practitioner. In doing so the *Review* will provide a public forum for the discussion and development of European external policy interests and strategies, addressing issues from the points of view of political science and policy-making, law or economics. These issues should be discussed by authors drawn from around the world while maintaining a European focus.

EDITORIAL POLICY

The editors will consider for publication unsolicited manuscripts in English as well as commissioned articles. Authors should ensure that their contributions will be apparent also to readers outside their specific expertise. Articles may deal with general policy questions as well as with more specialized topics. Articles will be subjected to a review procedure, and manuscripts will be edited, if necessary, to improve the effectiveness of communication. It is intended to establish and maintain a high standard in order to attain international recognition.

SUBMISSION OF MANUSCRIPTS

Manuscripts should be submitted to the Editorial Assistant at the Editorial Office. The manuscript should be accompanied by a covering letter stating that the article has not been published, or submitted for publication, elsewhere. Authors are asked to submit two copies of their manuscript as well as a copy on computer disk. Manuscripts should be 6,000-8,000 words and be typed, double spaced and with wide margins. The title of an article should begin with a word useful in indexing and information retrieval. Short titles are invited for use as running heads. All footnotes should be numbered in sequential order, as cited in the text, and should be typed double-spaced on a separate sheet. The author should submit a short biography of him or herself.

BOOK REVIEWS

Copies of books sent to the Editorial Assistant at the Editorial Office will be considered for review.